

# Bond Market Developments in the Fourth Quarter of 2025

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## Section 1. Local Currency Bonds Outstanding

**Emerging East Asian local currency (LCY) bonds outstanding reached USD30.6 trillion at the end of December 2025, with the market's expansion easing in the fourth quarter (Q4) as issuance declined from the previous quarter.**<sup>5</sup> The expansion of LCY bonds outstanding slowed to 2.1% quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q) in Q4 2025 from 3.2% q-o-q in the third quarter (Q3), as most regional governments had met their annual borrowing targets in earlier quarters (**Figure 1A**).


- Treasury and other government bonds outstanding in emerging East Asia totaled USD19.9 trillion at the end of December, accounting for 65.1% of the region's LCY bond stock. Government bonds outstanding expanded 2.0% q-o-q in Q4 2025, down from 3.7% q-o-q in the previous quarter, on reduced issuance as a majority of governments in the region had already fulfilled most of their annual borrowing needs in earlier quarters. The Philippines saw an uptick in its government bond stock due to a smaller volume of maturities. Viet Nam's government bonds outstanding expanded at an accelerated pace as the government continued issuance to meet its 2025 target.
- Corporate bonds outstanding (USD10.0 trillion) at the end of Q4 2025 comprised 32.7% of the region's total LCY bond market. The expansion of corporate bonds outstanding was broadly stable in Q4 2025, slowing marginally to 2.3% q-o-q from 2.5% q-o-q in the prior quarter. Viet Nam's corporate bonds outstanding rose 7.0% q-o-q, fueled by robust issuance as firms **refinanced** maturing debt. Expansion in most of the region's other corporate bond markets slowed from the previous quarter.
- The PRC remained the region's largest market, expanding 2.2% q-o-q to reach USD25.0 trillion at the end of Q4 2025 and accounting for 81.7% of the regional LCY bond stock (**Figure 1B**). This was followed by the Republic of Korea with a 7.9% share. ASEAN member economies' aggregate bond stock tallied USD2.7 trillion on expansion of 1.2% q-o-q, accounting for 8.8% of the region's total bond stock. Among ASEAN markets, Viet Nam made the largest contribution to the region's LCY bond market expansion in Q4 2025, with its bond stock surging 10.5% q-o-q to USD151.1 billion.
- LCY bonds outstanding as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in emerging East Asia reached 115.8% at the end of Q4 2025, which was less than the corresponding percentages for the bond markets of the European Union 20 (EU-20) (134.2%) and the United States (US) (141.2%). The Republic of Korea and Malaysia led the region with the highest percentages of LCY bonds outstanding to GDP at 130.0% and 129.5%, respectively (**Figure 1C**).
- The size-weighted average tenor of Treasury bonds outstanding in emerging East Asia reached 9.1 years at the end of Q4 2025, exceeding that of the EU-20 (8.2 years) and the US (7.5 years). Around 53.9% of outstanding bonds in the region had remaining tenors of more than 5 years at the end of Q4 2025 (**Figure 1D**). In most ASEAN markets and the Republic of Korea, the share of Treasury bonds with remaining tenors longer than 10 years comprised over one-third of the total LCY bond stock. The size-weighted average tenor at the end of Q4 2025 was 13.8 years in the Republic of Korea and 9.4 years in ASEAN. Within ASEAN, Treasury bonds in Thailand and Singapore had the longest average tenors of 11.2 years and 9.9 years, respectively.

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
<sup>5</sup> Emerging East Asia is defined to include member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea.

Figure 1: Local Currency Bonds Outstanding in Emerging East Asian Markets


A. Local Currency Bonds Outstanding




B. Local Currency Bonds Outstanding at the End of December 2025



C. Local Currency Bonds Outstanding as a Share of Gross Domestic Product in Q3 2025 Versus Q4 2025



D. Maturity Structure of Treasury Bonds Outstanding at the End of September 2025 Versus the End of December 2025



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; PRC = People's Republic of China; EEA = emerging East Asia; EU-20 = European Union 20; GDP = gross domestic product; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; RHS = right-hand side; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; US = United States; USD = United States dollar; VIE = Viet Nam.


Notes:

- Emerging East Asia is defined to include member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea.
- The EU-20 includes the member markets of Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
- Gross domestic product data for Q4 2025 are carried over from Q3 2025 for the Republic of Korea and the US.

Source: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on various local market sources.

**Treasury bonds outstanding in emerging East Asia at the end of Q4 2025 were mainly held by banks (Figure 2).** Banking institutions held 35.7% of outstanding Treasuries in the region, with notable increases in Indonesia, where banks’ holdings rose to 20.2% at the end of 2025 from 17.4% a year earlier as **foreign investors withdrew** from the market. In the PRC, banks’ holding share increased to 69.2% from 66.6% during the same period as demand for **bank loans weakened**. **Box 2** shows that systemic risk from growing bank–insurer interconnectedness is a tail phenomenon, intensifying sharply during extreme market conditions. Policymakers should focus on extremes—not averages—to safeguard financial stability. Strengthening market structures can help mitigate such risks by building a resilient LCY bond market. Insurance companies and pension funds were the second-largest investors in regional Treasury bonds in Q4 2025, holding 29.2% of the region’s outstanding Treasuries, similar to their 29.1% share a year earlier. Meanwhile, the holdings share of foreign investors fell slightly to 10.7% from 10.8%, central banks’ holding share dropped to 5.5% from 5.8%, while mutual funds’ share dipped to 2.2% from 2.4%. These shifts contributed to increased investor concentration in the emerging East Asian Treasury bond market, as evidenced by a higher Herfindahl–Hirschman Index score in Q4 2025 compared with a year earlier.<sup>6</sup>

**Figure 2: Investor Profiles of Local Currency Treasury Bonds in Select Emerging East Asian Markets**



EEA = emerging East Asia, RHS = right-hand side.

Notes:

1. Data for the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Viet Nam are up to September 2025.
2. "Others" include government institutions, individuals, securities companies, custodians, private corporations, and all other investors not elsewhere classified.
3. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. In this case, the index was used to measure the investor profile diversification of local currency bond markets and is calculated by summing the squared share of each investor group in a bond market. A lower score indicates greater diversity.

Sources: People's Republic of China (CEIC Data Company); Indonesia (Directorate General of Budget Financing and Risk Management, Ministry of Finance); Republic of Korea (Bank of Korea); Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia); Philippines (Bureau of the Treasury); Thailand (Bank of Thailand); and Viet Nam (Ministry of Finance).

<sup>6</sup> The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The index is used to measure the investor profile diversification of the region's LCY bond markets and is calculated by summing the squared share of each investor group in the bond market. A lower score indicates greater diversity.

## Box 2: When Banks and Insurers Move Together—Why Systemic Risk Lives in the Tails?

### Why Bank–Insurance Linkages Matter More Than Ever?

The global financial system no longer operates in silos.<sup>a</sup> Over the past 2 decades, a significant convergence has occurred: Banks have expanded into insurance and asset management, while insurers have deepened their presence in capital markets through corporate bonds, private equity, derivatives, and structured products (Allen and Jagtiani 2000, Bernardi and Petrella 2015, Foglia and Angelini 2020). As the distinction between bank risk and insurance risk becomes increasingly blurred, regulators and policymakers in Asia and beyond face a critical question:

When shocks hit the financial system, do these institutions absorb risk independently, or do they amplify each other's stress?

### Why Averages Can Be Misleading?

Most empirical measures of financial connectedness, such as correlation or standard vector–autoregression–based spillover indices, focus on mean relationships. These tools are useful, but they implicitly assume that risk transmission is linear and stable across time. However, financial markets are anything but linear. During tranquil periods, banks and insurers may appear loosely connected: Diversification works, shocks are absorbed locally, and institutions retain a degree of independence. But during financial crises, global pandemics, geopolitical conflicts, or sharp monetary tightening, this insulation often disappears.

This box argues that systemic risk between banks and insurers is fundamentally a tail phenomenon. By looking beyond averages and into the extremes of the return distribution, we uncover a striking pattern: Connectedness between banks and insurers intensifies dramatically during periods of market stress and exuberance, while remaining fragmented in normal times.

### What the Data Say: Risk Lives in the Tails?

Using daily stock returns of the world's top 10 banks and top 10 insurance companies from 2016 to 2025, we first examine the basic statistical properties of these returns.<sup>b</sup> The evidence is striking. For instance, average returns are close to zero for both banks and insurers, while volatility is high and heterogeneous across institutions. Return distributions exhibit extreme kurtosis, far exceeding the Gaussian

(normal) benchmark, and skewness is generally close to zero, suggesting no obvious dominance of upside or downside risk. In plain language, extreme events occur frequently on both the positive and negative sides of the return distribution, even if the overall distribution does not exhibit a strong skew in one direction.

Visual inspection of the return series reinforces this message (**Figures B2.1 and B2.2**). Large spikes, both positive and negative, appear in clusters during well-known stress episodes such as the coronavirus disease pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These spikes are not isolated outliers; they are a defining feature of the data, occurring in bunches rather than singly. The implication is clear: Systemic risk cannot be understood by looking at averages alone.

### A Quantile Perspective on Connectedness

To capture this tail behavior, we adopt a quantile-based connectedness framework. Instead of estimating spillovers at the mean, we examine how shocks propagate across institutions at different points of the return distribution. In particular, we focus on the lower tail (5th percentile) to represent periods of market stress and distress, the median (50th percentile) for normal market conditions, and the upper tail (95th percentile) to reflect periods of exuberance and risk-taking. This approach allows us to ask whether connectedness behaves differently when markets are calm versus when they are under pressure. The answer is an emphatic “yes” (**Table B2**).


### What Happens to Connectedness Across Market States?

In normal market conditions, total connectedness is moderate and directional, with commercial banks tending to receive shocks, while investment banks (e.g., Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley) and large insurers (e.g., Allianz SE, Berkshire Hathaway, Chubb, Cigna, Marsh and McLennan, Progressive Corporation, United Health Group) act as transmitters. In this state, diversification offers protection, and risk transmission is selective rather than systemic.

**Normal times: fragmented and directional.** At the median quantile (normal market conditions), total connectedness between banks and insurers is relatively moderate. More importantly, directional patterns emerge: Commercial banks tend to be net receivers of shocks, while market-based

Box 2 continued


Figure B2.1: Daily Bank Returns Illustrating Volatility Clustering and Extreme Movements



ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, BAC = Bank of America, BC = Bank of China, CCB = China Construction Bank, GS = Goldman Sachs, HSBC = The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, JPM = JP Morgan Chase, MS = Morgan Stanley, WFC = Wells Fargo.  
Source: Yahoo Finance.

Box 2 continued

Figure B2.2: Daily Returns for Insurance Companies Illustrating Volatility Clustering and Extreme Movements



AIA = AIA Group, ALIZF = Allianz SE, BRK = Berkshire Hathaway, CB = Chubb, CIGNA = Cigna, CLI = China Life Insurance, MMC = Marsh and McLennan, PGR = Progressive Corporation, PING = Ping An Insurance, UNH = UnitedHealth Group.  
 Source: Yahoo Finance.

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Box 2 *continued*

Table B2: Connectedness Between Banks and Insurers

	$\tau = 0.05$				$\tau = 0.5$				$\tau = 0.95$			
	OWN	FROM	TO	NET	OWN	FROM	TO	NET	OWN	FROM	TO	NET
JPM	4.97	95.03	92.94	(2.10)	13.21	86.79	102.90	16.16	5.10	94.90	94.54	(0.36)
ICBC	4.80	95.20	90.23	(4.97)	20.80	79.20	71.46	(7.74)	4.76	95.24	88.84	(6.40)
BAC	4.94	95.06	92.79	(2.27)	13.10	86.90	99.15	12.26	5.19	94.81	96.21	1.40
ABC	4.89	95.11	91.68	(3.43)	21.62	78.38	69.36	(9.02)	4.93	95.07	91.38	(3.68)
WFC	4.90	95.10	92.25	(2.85)	20.22	79.78	67.52	(12.26)	5.30	94.70	97.62	2.92
CCB	4.82	95.18	90.77	(4.41)	21.28	78.72	67.13	(11.59)	4.71	95.29	88.54	(6.75)
BC	4.90	95.10	91.77	(3.33)	21.45	78.55	70.21	(8.33)	5.02	94.98	92.94	(2.05)
HSBC	4.92	95.08	91.36	(3.72)	19.89	80.11	64.72	(15.39)	5.41	94.59	98.81	4.22
MS	5.02	94.98	94.22	(0.76)	12.48	87.52	101.20	13.69	5.08	94.92	94.82	(0.09)
GS	4.98	95.02	93.29	(1.73)	13.31	86.69	96.90	10.21	4.96	95.04	92.68	(2.36)
UNH	5.26	94.74	98.97	4.23	13.93	86.07	101.80	15.78	5.47	94.53	101.02	6.50
BRK	5.18	94.82	97.57	2.75	13.15	86.85	103.70	16.92	5.01	94.99	95.10	0.11
PING	5.06	94.94	93.80	(1.15)	30.05	69.95	56.01	(13.94)	5.10	94.90	95.13	0.23
AIA	5.24	94.76	97.35	2.59	29.18	70.82	58.61	(12.21)	5.26	94.74	98.15	3.40
CLI	5.04	94.96	95.17	0.21	26.69	73.31	56.75	(16.56)	5.11	94.89	95.87	0.98
CIGNA	5.09	94.91	96.03	1.12	14.34	85.66	95.45	9.79	4.91	95.09	92.69	(2.40)
MMC	5.53	94.47	104.10	9.68	12.19	87.81	108.40	20.61	5.33	94.67	100.08	5.40
CB	5.14	94.86	97.33	2.47	14.86	85.14	94.58	9.44	4.88	95.12	92.44	(2.68)
PGR	5.58	94.42	104.00	9.63	13.90	86.10	103.90	17.79	5.22	94.78	97.93	3.16
ALIZF	4.98	95.02	93.05	(1.97)	43.43	56.57	20.97	(35.60)	4.97	95.03	93.48	(1.55)
<b>TCI</b>	<b>94.94</b>				<b>80.55</b>				<b>94.91</b>			

( ) = negative, ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, AIA = AIA Group, ALIZF = Allianz SE, BAC = Bank of China, BOA = Bank of America, BRK = Berkshire Hathaway, CB = Chubb, CCB = China Construction Bank, CLI=China Life Insurance, CIGNA = Cigna, GS = Goldman Sachs, HSBC = The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, JPM = JP Morgan Chase, MMC = Marsh and McLennan, MS = Morgan Stanley, PING = Ping An Insurance, PGR = Progressive Corporation, TCI = Total Connectedness Index, UNH = United Health Group, WFC = Wells Fargo.

Source: Yahoo Finance.

institutions, including investment banks and large insurers, often act as net transmitters. In other words, spillovers have a clear direction and structure. In these conditions, diversification still offers some protection, and risk transmission remains selective rather than systemic.

#### Stress and exuberance: synchronized and overwhelming.

In extreme market conditions, the picture changes dramatically: At both the lower and upper quantiles, the Total Connectedness Index jumps to nearly 100%. In these states, institutions explain almost all of each other's forecast error variance. As a result, own risk becomes negligible and any directionality collapses into system-wide synchronization. In simple terms, when markets enter extreme conditions, banks and insurers stop behaving as separate entities and instead move as a tightly coupled

network. Notably, this result holds for both downturns and booms, indicating that exuberant markets can be just as systemically connected as distressed ones.

#### Asymmetry Across States, Not Just Positive or Negative Shocks

A key insight from the analysis is that the asymmetry lies not only between negative (downside) and positive (upside) shocks, but more fundamentally between normal and extreme market states. During normal times (median quantile), connectedness across institutions is moderate but more volatile, and risk transmission follows a directional pattern with identifiable transmitters and receivers. In contrast, during extreme states, whether driven by distress (5th percentile) or exuberance (95th percentile),

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**Box 2** *continued*

connectedness becomes extremely high and persistent, with institutions moving in near lockstep and the usual distinctions between shock transmitters and receivers disappearing. This state-dependent asymmetry suggests that systemic risk is not constant but conditional: It flares up precisely when the system becomes most vulnerable.

**Why Banks and Insurers Amplify Each Other?**

These findings help explain why bank–insurance linkages have become a central concern for regulators. Modern insurers are deeply exposed to financial markets through large investment portfolios, substantial corporate bond holdings, and extensive use of derivatives and reinsurance networks. Similarly, banks have increasingly ventured beyond traditional lending, relying more on noninterest income and market-based activities. When asset prices move sharply, both sectors are affected simultaneously, creating feedback loops that amplify shocks. Our results suggest that such cross-sector spillovers are not a sideshow—they are a core channel of systemic risk, particularly under extreme market conditions.

**Policy Implications for Central Banks and Supervisors**

The implications for policymakers in member economies of Southeast Asian Central Banks and beyond are significant. Monitoring averages is not enough. Traditional indicators may underestimate systemic risk precisely when it is building up; tail-sensitive tools are essential for early warning systems. Stress tests should be asymmetric. Stress testing frameworks should explicitly account for nonlinear spillovers and state-dependent amplification, rather than assuming proportional responses.

Cross-sector coordination is critical. Banking and insurance supervision cannot remain siloed. During extreme market conditions, risks propagate seamlessly across sectors. Diversification benefits vanish in crises. Portfolio

diversification across banks and insurers may appear effective in calm periods, but these benefits collapse when connectedness spikes in the tails.

**Conclusion**

Asian financial systems are increasingly integrated into global capital markets. As banks and insurers in the region expand their operations across borders, the potential for cross-border and cross-sector contagion grows. Understanding when and how connectedness intensifies can help regional authorities design better macroprudential buffers, coordinate responses across regulatory agencies, and anticipate systemic vulnerabilities before they materialize.

The key message from this research is simple but powerful: Systemic risk between banks and insurers is not constant; it emerges in the tails. By shifting our focus from averages to extremes, we gain a clearer picture of how financial shocks propagate and why crises feel so overwhelming when they occur. For policymakers, the lesson is equally clear: To safeguard financial stability, we must look where the risk actually lives, not at the center but at the edges of the distribution.

**References**

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This box was written by Nur Ain Shahrier (senior economist) at the South East Asian Central Banks Centre (SEACEN), and by Nouredine Benlagha (professor), Fahad Shafiq (master's student in finance), and Rashid Hassan Al-Derham (master's student in finance) from the Department of Finance and Economics, College of Business and Economics, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.

<sup>a</sup> This article draws on the working paper, When Banks and Insurers Move Together: Why Systemic Risk Lives in the Tails?, which is available at <https://lnkd.in/ggTAUzRG>.

<sup>b</sup> The top 10 global banks in our sample, listed alphabetically, are Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of America (BAC), Bank of China (BC), China Construction Bank (939 HK), Goldman Sachs (GS), HSBC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), JP Morgan Chase (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS), and Wells Fargo (WFC). The top 10 global insurance companies are AIA Group (1299 HK), Allianz SE (ALIZF), Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B), Chubb (CB), Cigna (CI), China Life Insurance (2628 HK), Marsh & McLennan (MMC), Ping An Insurance (2318 HK), Progressive Corporation (PGR), and UnitedHealth Group (UNH).

## Section 2. Local Currency Bond Issuance


### Emerging East Asian LCY bond issuance fell in Q4 2025 as both government and corporate borrowing declined.

Total LCY bond issuance contracted 11.1% q-o-q in Q4 2025 to USD2.9 trillion (**Figure 3A**). For full-year 2025, however, total issuance rose 12.7% year-on-year to USD12.0 trillion from USD10.7 trillion in 2024 on accommodative monetary stances.


- Issuance of government bonds contracted 22.0% q-o-q in Q4 2025, following 1.1% q-o-q growth in Q3 2025, as a majority of governments in the region had already fulfilled most of their annual borrowing plans in previous quarters. Government bond issuance in the PRC, which comprised 86.6% of the region’s government issuance total in Q4 2025, contracted 22.6% q-o-q, driven by reduced issuance of local government bonds and policy bank bonds (**Figure 3B**). Issuance in the PRC fell as local governments had fulfilled most of their annual quotas in prior quarters and as policy banks had previously accelerated **bond issuance** ahead of the reimposition of the value added tax on interest income in August. Issuance in the Republic of Korea and ASEAN member economies also decreased in Q4 2025, falling 30.4% q-o-q and 17.8% q-o-q, respectively, reflecting most governments’ front-loading issuance policies. On the other hand, issuance in Hong Kong, China rose almost ninefold in Q4 2025, in line with the planned auction schedule for the year and amid the outsized issuance of Silver Bonds in October (HKD55.0 billion).<sup>7</sup>
- Corporate bond sales fell 3.3% q-o-q in Q4 2025 to USD1.1 trillion, a reversal from the 5.1% q-o-q growth in Q3 2025, led by contractions in the PRC and ASEAN member economies. Issuance of corporate bonds in the PRC fell 5.4% q-o-q amid continued weak borrowing demand that was driven by economic uncertainty. Corporate bond issuance in ASEAN decreased 9.3% q-o-q in Q4 2025 as bond yields rose in most member economies, largely tracking the upward movement of yields in advanced economies as well as market-specific factors. In the Republic of Korea, corporate bond issuance rose 21.0% q-o-q as banks ramped up issuance to **secure liquidity** amid an outflow of bank deposits in Q4 2025. Investors in the Republic of Korea shifted their funds from low-yield bank instruments to the domestic stock market, which witnessed significant gains during the year.
- Central bank bond issuance in emerging East Asia decreased 0.3% q-o-q in Q4 2025, led by reduced issuance from most ASEAN central banks.

**Figure 3: Local Currency Bond Issuance in Select Emerging East Asian Markets**

#### A. Local Currency Bond Issuance



#### B. Market Structure in the Fourth Quarter of 2025



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; PRC = People’s Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; ROK = Republic of Korea; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; USD = United States dollar.

**Notes:**

1. ASEAN data include the markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
2. Figures were computed based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.


Source: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on various local market sources.

<sup>7</sup> Silver Bonds are 3-year government bonds specifically offered and catered to senior citizens in Hong Kong, China.


The size-weighted average maturity of Treasury bond issuances in emerging East Asia declined to 8.1 years in Q4 2025 from 11.4 years in Q3 2025 on increased short-term issuances. The share of Treasury bond issuances with a maturity of 5 years or less rose to 50.5% in Q4 2025 from 46.4% in the previous quarter (Figure 4A). In Hong Kong, China, the share of Treasury bond issuances with a maturity of more than 5 years (medium- to long-term bonds) plunged to 2.5% in Q4 2025 from 43.5% in Q3 2025, as the HKD55.0 billion worth of 3-year Silver Bonds sold by the government in October accounted for about 90% of quarterly issuance (Figure 4B). In the PRC, during the same period, the share of medium- to long-term Treasury bond issuances declined to 47.5% from 53.0% due to the reduced issuance of ultra-long-term special Treasury bonds, with the last tranche issued in October. In the Republic of Korea, the share of medium- to long-term bond issuances fell to 43.2% from 48.9%, driven by increased issuance of 2–5 year bonds. Medium- to long-term Treasury bond issuances comprised 70.9% of total Treasury bond issuance in ASEAN in Q4 2025, up from 63.0% in the previous quarter, lengthening the size-weighted average maturity to 12.7 years from 11.6 years. Viet Nam and Malaysia had the highest percentages of medium- to long-term bond issuances in Q4 2025 at 86.5% and 80.4%, respectively. Singapore registered the longest size-weighted average maturity in the region at 16.3 years.

Figure 4: Maturity Structure of Local Currency Treasury Bond Issuance in Emerging East Asian Markets

A. Maturity Structure by Quarter



B. Maturity Structure by Market



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; PRC = People’s Republic of China; EEA = emerging East Asia; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; RHS = right-hand side; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VIE = Viet Nam.

Notes:

1. Figures were computed based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.
2. Treasury bonds are local-currency-denominated, fixed-income securities issued by a government with maturities longer than 1 year.
3. Emerging East Asia is defined to include member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, China, and the Republic of Korea.

Source: AsianBondsOnline calculations based on various local market sources.


## Section 3: Intra-Regional Bond Issuance

**Emerging East Asia’s intra-regional bond issuance increased 18.7% q-o-q in Q4 2025, supported by improved financial conditions.**<sup>8</sup> The region’s intra-regional debt sales rose to USD17.0 billion from the previous quarter’s USD14.3 billion, while full-year 2025 issuance tallied USD52.1 billion, up 20.0% from USD43.4 billion in 2024 (Figure 5A). Growth in Q4 2025 was bolstered by increased debt sales in Hong Kong, China (USD13.0 billion) and the Republic of Korea (USD1.1 billion), as well as by the return of Malaysia (USD0.9 billion), Indonesia (USD0.9 billion), Thailand (USD0.1 billion), and Viet Nam (USD0.02 billion) to the intra-regional bond market.


- Emerging East Asia’s intra-regional bond market was dominated by issuers from Hong Kong, China, which accounted for 76.6% of the intra-regional total (Figure 5B). The Chinese yuan remained the primary currency of choice among intra-regional bond issuers in Q4 2025, accounting for 84.8% of the regional total. HKD-

Figure 5: Intra-Regional Bond Issuance in Emerging East Asian Markets


### A. Quarterly Issuance



### B. Market Structure in the Fourth Quarter of 2025



### C. Maturity Structure and Size-Weighted Average Maturity by Quarter



PRC = People’s Republic of China; CNY = Chinese yuan; HKD = Hong Kong dollar; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; LAO = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; MAL = Malaysia; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; RHS = right-hand side; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; USD = United States dollar; VIE = Viet Nam.

Notes:

- Emerging East Asia is defined to include member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea.
- Intra-regional bond issuance is defined as emerging East Asian bond issuance denominated in a regional currency excluding the issuer’s home currency.
- Figures were computed based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.
- Data are based on the domicile where the company’s senior management is located.
- Other currencies include Korean won and Singapore dollar.

Source: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on Bloomberg LP data.

<sup>8</sup> Intra-regional bond issuance is defined as emerging East Asian bond issuance denominated in a regional currency excluding the issuer’s home currency.

- denominated bonds accounted for 11.8%, down from 25.3% in Q3 2025.
- Corporate bonds accounted for 90.9% of total emerging East Asian intra-regional bond issuance in Q4 2025, largely driven by the financial (39.0%) and transportation (30.3%) sectors. Hong Kong, China's China Merchants Group was the region's leading intra-regional issuer, with aggregate issuance of CNY28.0 billion, representing 23.6% of the total in Q4 2025.
  - Sustainable bond issuance in the region's intra-regional bond market increased to USD2.5 billion in Q4 2025 from USD1.4 billion in the previous quarter. There were six green bond issuances from Hong Kong, China, totaling CNY14.7 billion. Korea Expressway Corporation also issued sustainability bonds worth HKD2.0 billion. Thailand returned to the intra-regional bond market for the first time since March 2023 via Muangthai Capital's dual-tranche social bonds worth SGD129.0 million. Despite this growth, the region's intra-regional bond market remained dominated by conventional instruments, which accounted for 85.6% of total intra-regional bond issuance during Q4 2025.
  - Most intra-regional bond issuances in Q4 2025 were concentrated in short- to medium-term maturities, lowering the size-weighted average maturity to 2.4 years from 3.7 years in Q3 2025. Issuances with maturities of 5 years or less accounted for 80.1% of the total in Q4 2025, with issuance volume heavily skewed toward shorter tenors (**Figure 5C**).

## Section 4. G3 Currency Bond Issuance

**Emerging East Asian G3 currency bond issuance fell 10.8% q-o-q to USD96.2 billion in Q4 2025 from a high base in the previous quarter, when issuance surged to USD107.8 billion.**<sup>9</sup> The reversal from the previous quarter's 45.5% q-o-q growth in the region's G3 currency bond issuance was due to reduced corporate issuance (**Figure 6A**). Weaker issuance in Q4 2025 capped otherwise robust annual issuance of G3-denominated bonds in 2025, which rose 41.7% year-on-year to USD351.4 billion as US interest rates declined.

- Corporate issuances comprised 76.1% of G3-denominated bond issuances in emerging East Asia in Q4 2025, with only 23.9% of the total issued by public sector entities. G3-denominated corporate bond sales were dominated by the real estate (33.2%), financial (28.6%), and industrial (12.2%) sectors. The real estate sector's G3 bond issuance during the quarter was buoyed by increased issuance from the PRC.
- The PRC led emerging East Asia's G3 issuance in Q4 2025 with USD61.8 billion, accounting for 64.2% of the regional total on a 10.3% q-o-q increase. The increase was buoyed by real estate companies' debt-restructuring programs. Country Garden and Sunac China issued USD-denominated bonds worth an aggregate USD22.6 billion, which comprised 23.5% of the regional quarterly total. The Government of the PRC sold EUR- and USD-denominated issuances worth USD8.7 billion, reinforcing the PRC's offshore market presence.<sup>10</sup>
- G3 bond issuance from ASEAN economies tallied USD18.6 billion in Q4 2025, contracting 24.1% q-o-q and accounting for 19.3% of the region's quarterly total (**Figure 6B**). G3-denominated issuance from ASEAN economies fell on reduced corporate issuance, which declined 34.1% q-o-q. Several ASEAN economies saw reduced G3 bond issuance, including the Philippines (-65.3% q-o-q), Singapore (-55.0% q-o-q), Thailand (-24.1% q-o-q), and Indonesia (-8.1% q-o-q). The Lao People's Democratic Republic issued USD0.3 billion worth of notes for **government refinancing**, its first offshore foreign currency bond issuance since 2019.
- The share of EUR-denominated bonds in the region's total G3 issuance increased in Q4 2025 to 11.8% from 9.3% in the previous quarter as borrowing costs for EUR-denominated assets decreased and investors sought portfolio diversification.<sup>11</sup>
- Over half (59.4%) of G3 issuances in Q4 2025 carried a maturity of 5 years or less, down slightly from 59.8% in Q3 2025 (**Figure 6C**). The size-weighted average maturity of regional G3 bond issuance fell to 5.0 years in Q4 2025 from 5.6 years in the previous quarter.


<sup>9</sup> G3 currency bonds are bonds denominated in either euros, Japanese yen, or United States dollars.

<sup>10</sup> Zxouxiang, Z., and J. Xueqing. 2025. *Nation's Euro Bond Sale Shows Investors' Confidence*. *China Daily*. 21 November.


<sup>11</sup> *Business Times*. 2025. *US Loses Financing Edge as Asia Borrows in Euros*. 7 December.

Figure 6: G3 Currency Bond Issuance in Emerging East Asian Markets


A. Monthly Bond Issuance by Currency



B. Market Shares in the Fourth Quarter of 2025



C. Maturity Structure and Size-Weighted Average Maturity by Subgroup



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; PRC = People’s Republic of China; EEA = emerging East Asia; EUR = euro; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; JPY = Japanese yen; ROK = Republic of Korea; LAO = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; RHS = right-hand side; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; USD = United States dollar; VIE = Viet Nam.

Notes:

- Emerging East Asia is defined to include the member states of ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea. ASEAN data include the markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
- G3 currency bonds are denominated in either euros, Japanese yen, or United States dollars.
- Figures were computed based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.

Source: AsianBondsOnline calculations based on Bloomberg LP data.

## Section 5. Liquidity of LCY Bond Markets


Emerging East Asian LCY bond markets witnessed improved liquidity in 2025, buoyed by favorable financial conditions over monetary policy easing and sound economic fundamentals across the region.<sup>12</sup> Turnover ratios and average trading volumes for both LCY government and corporate bonds rose in 2025, while bid-ask spreads witnessed marginal declines in most regional markets.

### Government Bond Markets


**Bid-ask spreads for LCY government bonds narrowed in most regional markets in 2025 amid monetary policy easing.** The region’s average bid-ask spread for on-the-run LCY government bonds remained at 5.7 basis points (bps), the same as in 2024, as the widening of spreads in the Philippines and Viet Nam offset narrowing in most regional markets (**Figure 7A**). The bid-ask spread widened the most in Viet Nam, by 3 bps, amid tightened financial conditions and decreased risk appetite over a rapid credit expansion aimed to support the government’s economic growth targets. In the Philippines, the slight widening of the bid-ask spread, by 0.5 bps, was largely due to the reduced supply of bonds in Q4 2025 as the government scaled back issuance following outsized issuances of 10-year bonds and retail Treasury bonds in earlier quarters. Bid-ask spreads for off-the-run LCY government bonds narrowed in all regional economies in 2025 except the PRC, the Philippines, and Viet Nam (**Figure 7B**). The uptick in bid-ask spreads in these three markets pushed up the regional average to 6.6 bps in 2025 from 6.3 bps a year earlier. The bid-ask spread for off-the-run government bonds widened to 2.7 bps from 2.4 bps in the PRC, partly driven by a decline in trading volume caused by the People’s Bank of China’s bond-buying pause in January–October 2025, which reduced bond trading activity and market liquidity.

**Figure 7: Average Bid-Ask Spreads for Local Currency Government Bonds**

**A. On-the-Run Government Bonds**



**B. Off-the-Run Government Bonds**



PRC = People’s Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VIE = Viet Nam.

Note: The regional bid-ask spread refers to the average spread of the nine markets of emerging East Asia.


Source: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on Bloomberg LP data.

<sup>12</sup> Emerging East Asia is defined to include member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea.


**Turnover ratios in most government bond markets in the region increased in 2025, supported by monetary policy easing.** Higher turnover ratios were witnessed in six out of nine regional bond markets in 2025, supported by monetary policy easing from several regional central banks. Turnover ratios were higher in the second and third quarters of 2025, when most rate cuts were conducted (**Figure 8A**). Most markets registered higher average trading volumes in 2025 compared to 2024 (**Figure 8B**). However, the PRC and Hong Kong, China witnessed less trading activity in 2025 than in the prior year, resulting in the regional average turnover ratio (0.45) not changing between 2024 and 2025. The reduced trading volumes in the PRC and Hong Kong, China were partly driven by investors **return chasing** by shifting from bonds to equities over optimism in the AI and technology sectors. In the PRC, the decline in the turnover ratio in 2025 was partly driven by the central bank **halting government bond purchases** from January to October 2025.

**Figure 8: Local Currency Government Bond Turnover Ratios and Trading Volumes in Emerging East Asian Markets**

**A. Turnover Ratios**



**B. Average Quarterly Trading Volumes**



PRC = People's Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; VIE = Viet Nam.

**Notes:**


1. Turnover ratios are calculated as the local currency trading volume (sales amount only) divided by the average local currency value of outstanding bonds during each 3-month period.
2. For 2024 average turnover ratios, figures are based on the simple average of quarterly turnover ratios for each market.
3. For Viet Nam, the Q4 2025 turnover ratio was carried over from Q3 2025.
4. For quarterly average trading volumes, figures are based on the simple average of quarterly trading volumes for each market.

Sources: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on various local market sources.

## Corporate Bond Markets

**Liquidity in regional corporate bond markets remained largely stable in 2025, supported by continued monetary easing.** The region's overall corporate bid-ask spread narrowed slightly to 17.1 bps in 2025 from 17.4 bps in 2024 (**Figure 9**). Corporate bid-ask spreads fell the most in Indonesia, by 1.8 s, over continued monetary policy easing by Bank Indonesia, particularly in Q3 2025. In Singapore, bid-ask spreads declined 1.6 bps from 2024 to 2025 amid easing adjustments to the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate and a recovery in corporate bond demand over stronger-than-expected economic growth. Singapore's GDP expanded 5.0% on an annual basis in 2025. While liquidity remained stable in the Philippines, it had the widest bid-ask spreads in both 2024 and 2025, driven by a relatively shallow corporate bond market with few active issuers.

**Figure 9: Average Bid-Ask Spreads for Local Currency Corporate Bonds**



PRC = People's Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; SIN = Singapore.


Note: The regional bid-ask spread refers to the average spread of the seven markets of emerging East Asia for which where data are available.

Source: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on Bloomberg LP data.


The region’s average corporate bond turnover ratio slightly improved in 2025. The regional turnover ratio for corporate bonds averaged 0.16 in 2025, up from 0.12 in 2024. While most emerging East Asian markets saw an increase in their respective trading volumes during the review period, corporate bond trading volumes were still much lower than those for government bonds across the region—with the average turnover ratio being less than one-third that for government bonds (Figure 10A). Indonesia saw a notable improvement in its corporate bond turnover ratio in the first 3 quarters of 2025, as declining interest rates boosted investor appetite amid a significant amount of maturities and refinancing. The corporate bond turnover ratio in the Philippines was stable during the review period, remaining the lowest in the region as most investors in this market tend to buy and hold corporate bonds until maturity. The Philippines also had the lowest annual trading volume in the region in 2025 at only USD0.6 billion (Figure 10B).

Figure 10: Local Currency Corporate Bond Turnover Ratios and Trading Volumes in Emerging East Asian Markets

A. Turnover Ratios



B. Trading Volumes



PRC = People’s Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; INO = Indonesia; ROK = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter; THA = Thailand; USD = United States dollar.

Notes:

1. Turnover ratios are calculated as the local currency trading volume (sales amount only) divided by the average local currency value of outstanding bonds during each 3-month period.
2. For 2024 and 2025 averages, figures are based on a simple average of the quarterly turnover ratios for each market.

Sources: *AsianBondsOnline* calculations based on various local market sources.

## Appendix

Table A1: Size and Composition of Select Emerging East Asian Local Currency Bond Markets

	Q4 2024		Q3 2025		Q4 2025			Growth Rate (%)	
	Amount (USD billion)	% of GDP	Amount (USD billion)	% of GDP	Amount (USD billion)	% share	% of GDP	Q4 2025	
								q-o-q	y-o-y
<b>People's Republic of China</b>									
<b>Total</b>	21,252	115.0	24,000	123.1	25,002	100.0	124.5	2.2	12.6
Treasury and Other Government	14,440	78.1	16,604	85.2	17,290	69.2	86.1	2.2	14.6
Central Bank	2	0.01	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	-	(100.0)
Corporate	6,810	36.8	7,396	37.9	7,712	30.8	38.4	2.3	8.4
<b>Hong Kong, China</b>									
<b>Total</b>	402	98.0	445	105.2	473	100.0	110.4	6.3	17.8
Treasury and Other Government	39	9.5	33	7.8	41	8.7	9.6	24.4	5.5
Central Bank	168	41.0	171	40.5	172	36.5	40.3	0.8	2.7
Corporate	195	47.5	241	56.9	259	54.8	60.6	7.8	33.3
<b>Indonesia</b>									
<b>Total</b>	477	34.7	476	34.0	483	100.0	33.9	1.6	4.9
Treasury and Other Government	387	28.1	398	28.4	404	83.7	28.3	1.7	8.4
Central Bank	61	4.5	47	3.3	47	9.7	3.3	(0.1)	(21.1)
Corporate	29	2.1	31	2.2	32	6.7	2.3	3.9	13.9
<b>Republic of Korea</b>									
<b>Total</b>	2,241	129.0	2,456	131.4	2,428	100.0	130.0	1.4	6.0
Treasury and Other Government	847	48.8	972	52.0	953	39.3	51.0	0.6	10.1
Central Bank	79	4.5	75	4.0	75	3.1	4.0	2.5	(7.2)
Corporate	1,315	75.7	1,409	75.4	1,400	57.7	74.9	1.9	4.2
<b>Malaysia</b>									
<b>Total</b>	468	126.8	530	130.7	554	100.0	129.5	0.8	7.4
Treasury and Other Government	273	73.9	307	75.7	320	57.8	74.9	0.5	6.6
Central Bank	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	-	-
Corporate	195	52.9	223	55.0	234	42.2	54.7	1.1	8.6
<b>Philippines</b>									
<b>Total</b>	223	48.9	237	49.8	233	100.0	48.9	(0.7)	6.0
Treasury and Other Government	187	40.8	203	42.7	203	87.3	42.7	1.2	10.9
Central Bank	14	3.0	10	2.2	6	2.5	1.2	(43.6)	(56.4)
Corporate	23	5.1	23	4.9	24	10.2	5.0	2.1	2.7
<b>Singapore</b>									
<b>Total</b>	622	111.0	695	114.9	698	100.0	113.6	0.03	5.6
Treasury and Other Government	225	40.2	257	42.4	257	36.9	41.9	(0.1)	7.6
Central Bank	249	44.5	276	45.6	276	39.6	45.0	(0.3)	4.3
Corporate	148	26.4	163	26.9	164	23.5	26.7	0.7	4.6
<b>Thailand</b>									
<b>Total</b>	501	91.4	544	93.4	566	100.0	94.0	1.1	4.5
Treasury and Other Government	297	54.1	328	56.2	341	60.2	56.6	1.1	6.2
Central Bank	69	12.5	79	13.6	84	14.9	14.0	3.2	13.6
Corporate	136	24.7	137	23.5	141	24.9	23.4	(0.1)	(4.0)
<b>Viet Nam</b>									
<b>Total</b>	124	27.5	136	28.9	151	100.0	30.9	10.5	25.6
Treasury and Other Government	87	19.3	93	19.6	97	64.3	19.9	4.5	15.1
Central Bank	5	1.2	7	1.5	15	9.7	3.0	107.5	178.7
Corporate	32	7.0	37	7.8	39	26.0	8.0	7.0	28.6
<b>Emerging East Asia</b>									
<b>Total</b>	26,311	107.9	29,520	114.7	30,588	100.0	115.8	2.1	11.6
Treasury and Other Government	16,781	68.8	19,195	74.6	19,908	65.1	75.4	2.0	13.8
Central Bank	646	2.7	665	2.6	674	2.2	2.6	1.2	1.2
Corporate	8,883	36.4	9,660	37.5	10,006	32.7	37.9	2.3	8.1
<b>Japan</b>									
<b>Total</b>	8,853	219.4	9,536	214.7	9,037	100.0	213.7	0.4	1.8
Treasury and Other Government	8,154	202.1	8,771	197.4	8,322	92.1	196.8	0.5	1.7
Central Bank	20	0.5	20	0.4	7	0.1	0.2	(61.2)	(64.3)
Corporate	678	16.8	745	16.8	708	7.8	16.7	0.6	4.0

( ) = negative, - = not applicable, GDP = gross domestic product, Q3 = third quarter, Q4 = fourth quarter, q-o-q = quarter-on-quarter, USD = United States dollar, y-o-y = year-on-year. Notes:

- Emerging East Asia is defined to include the member states of ASEAN plus the People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea.
- For Singapore, corporate bonds outstanding are based on *AsianBondsOnline* estimates.
- Growth rates are calculated from a local currency base and do not include currency effects. For emerging East Asia, growth figures are based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.
- GDP data are from CEIC Data Company. GDP data are as of end-September 2025 for the Republic of Korea.
- Bloomberg LP end-of-period local currency-USD rates are used.

Sources: People's Republic of China (CEIC Data Company); Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong Monetary Authority); European Union 20 (European Central Bank); Indonesia (Bank Indonesia; Directorate General of Budget Financing and Risk Management, Ministry of Finance; and Indonesia Stock Exchange); Republic of Korea (Bank of Korea and KG Zeroin Corporation); Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia); Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Bureau of the Treasury and Bloomberg LP); Singapore (Monetary Authority Singapore and Bloomberg LP); Thailand (Bank of Thailand and Thai Bond Market Association); United States (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Bloomberg LP); and Viet Nam (Hanoi Stock Exchange, State Bank of Vietnam, Vietnam Bond Market Association, and Bloomberg LP).

Table A2: Local-Currency-Denominated Bond Issuance

	Q4 2024		Q3 2025		Q4 2025		Growth Rate (%)	
	Amount (USD billion)	% share	Amount (USD billion)	% share	Amount (USD billion)	% share	Q4 2025	
							q-o-q	y-o-y
<b>People's Republic of China</b>								
<b>Total</b>	1,652	100.0	2,106	100.0	1,811	100.0	(15.6)	5.0
Treasury and Other Government	953	57.7	1,253	59.5	988	54.6	(22.6)	(0.7)
Central Bank	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	-	-
Corporate	699	42.3	853	40.5	823	45.4	(5.4)	12.7
<b>Hong Kong, China</b>								
<b>Total</b>	181	100.0	203	100.0	211	100.0	4.0	16.9
Treasury and Other Government	11	5.9	0.9	0.5	8	3.9	793.1	(22.2)
Central Bank	134	74.3	138	68.0	150	71.1	8.7	11.9
Corporate	36	19.8	64	32	53	25.0	(17.7)	47.4
<b>Indonesia</b>								
<b>Total</b>	46	100.0	55	100.0	55	100.0	(0.1)	25.3
Treasury and Other Government	14	31.6	19	34.0	14	25.8	(24.3)	2.5
Central Bank	28	61.5	32	58.6	37	67.9	15.7	38.2
Corporate	3	6.9	4	7.4	4	6.3	(13.9)	14.8
<b>Republic of Korea</b>								
<b>Total</b>	194	100.0	207	100.0	209	100.0	3.4	5.5
Treasury and Other Government	28	14.4	62	30.1	42	20.3	(30.4)	48.2
Central Bank	14	7.4	18	8.6	17	8.0	(3.5)	14.6
Corporate	151	78.2	127	61.3	150	71.7	21.0	(3.2)
<b>Malaysia</b>								
<b>Total</b>	18	100.0	31	100.0	27	100.0	(14.5)	36.7
Treasury and Other Government	7	39.2	13	43.6	8	31.4	(38.4)	9.5
Central Bank	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	-	-
Corporate	11	60.8	17	56.4	19	68.6	4.0	54.2
<b>Philippines</b>								
<b>Total</b>	41	100.0	50	100.0	30	100.0	(39.8)	(26.2)
Treasury and Other Government	7	17.7	22	43.6	9	31.6	(56.4)	31.9
Central Bank	33	79.7	24	49.0	19	62.4	(23.3)	(42.2)
Corporate	1	2.6	4	7.4	2	5.9	(51.5)	70.4
<b>Singapore</b>								
<b>Total</b>	411	100.0	443	100.0	433	100.0	(2.6)	(0.8)
Treasury and Other Government	40	9.8	51	11.5	50	11.4	(3.3)	16.2
Central Bank	367	89.4	385	86.8	380	87.7	(1.6)	(2.7)
Corporate	3	0.8	8	1.7	4	0.9	(50.5)	3.1
<b>Thailand</b>								
<b>Total</b>	61	100.0	69	100.0	70	100.0	(0.9)	6.3
Treasury and Other Government	18	29.0	16	23.0	15	22.0	(5.3)	(19.2)
Central Bank	33	54.4	42	60.4	43	61.2	0.4	19.7
Corporate	10	16.6	11	16.6	12	16.8	0.2	7.2
<b>Viet Nam</b>								
<b>Total</b>	37	100.0	48	100.0	44	100.0	(7.6)	25.2
Treasury and Other Government	2	6.3	2	4.3	5	10.4	124.4	107.6
Central Bank	30	82.7	42	87.8	35	78.8	(17.1)	19.3
Corporate	4	11.0	4	7.9	5	10.8	26.5	22.5
<b>Emerging East Asia</b>								
<b>Total</b>	2,639	100.0	3,212	100.0	2,891	100.0	(11.1)	5.3
Treasury and Other Government	1,080	40.9	1,439	44.8	1,141	39.5	(22.0)	1.2
Central Bank	640	24.3	681	21.2	681	23.5	(0.3)	2.6
Corporate	919	34.8	1,092	34.0	1,070	37.0	(3.3)	12.0
<b>Japan</b>								
<b>Total</b>	340	100.0	349	100.0	339	100.0	3.2	(0.5)
Treasury and Other Government	301	88.6	315	90.3	310	91.4	4.4	2.7
Central Bank	11	3.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	-	(100.0)
Corporate	28	8.2	34	9.7	29	8.6	(8.0)	4.0

( ) = negative, - = not applicable, Q3 = third quarter, Q4 = fourth quarter, q-o-q = quarter-on-quarter, USD = United States dollar, y-o-y = year-on-year.

Notes:

1. Data reflect gross bond issuance.
2. Bloomberg LP end-of-period local currency-USD rates are used.
3. Growth rates are calculated from a local currency base and do not include currency effects. For emerging East Asia, growth figures are based on 31 December 2025 currency exchange rates and do not include currency effects.

Sources: People's Republic of China (CEIC Data Company); Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong Monetary Authority); Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, Directorate General of Budget Financing and Risk Management, Ministry of Finance; and Indonesia Stock Exchange); Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association); Republic of Korea (Bank of Korea and KG Zerin Corporation); Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia); Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Bureau of the Treasury and Bloomberg LP); Singapore (Monetary Authority of Singapore and Bloomberg LP); Thailand (Bank of Thailand and Thai Bond Market Association); and Viet Nam (Hanoi Stock Exchange, State Bank of Vietnam, Vietnam Bond Market Association, and Bloomberg LP).